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Forget Politicizing Science. Let’s Democratize
Science!

by David H. Guston
PDF Version
Since the publication last year
by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Ca.) of a report alleging that the Bush
administration has been inappropriately manipulating scientific reports
and advisory committees, science policy has become an issue with
surprisingly long political legs. The administration dismissed Waxman’s
report as a partisan distortion and a politicization of science in its
own right. But this charge became somewhat harder to sustain with the
publication of a like-minded report by the Union of Concerned Scientists
and a letter, signed by a left-leaning but still bipartisan group of
scientists, again alleging that the administration has inappropriately
played politics with the findings of government scientists and with
appointments to federal scientific advisory panels.
John Marburger, director of the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy, eventually responded with
his own defensively toned report. The political right also took aim
with a critique of leftist science in Politicizing Science, published by
the conservative Hoover Institution. Without close examination of each
allegation, it is hard to judge whether one side is engaging in the more
significant distortion or whether both sides are merely viewing business
as usual through a lens fractured along partisan lines.
Regardless, such
allegations that science has been politicized are unproductive. I also
suspect them of being somewhat insincere, in the same way that Louis,
the Vichy Prefect of Police in Casablanca, was “shocked, shocked” to
find gambling in the back room at Rick’s, even as he collected his own
winnings. From the $120 billion for scientific R&D that the government
provides, to the petty power plays that plague departmental governance,
science is deeply political. Asking whether science is politicized
distracts us from asking. “Who benefits and loses from which forms of
politicization?” and “What are the appropriate institutional channels
for political discourse, influence, and action in science?” Arguing over
whether science is politicized neglects the more critical question: “Is
science democratized?”
Democratizing science does not mean settling questions about Nature by
plebiscite, any more than democratizing politics means setting the prime
rate by referendum. What democratization does mean, in science as
elsewhere, is creating institutions and practices that fully incorporate
principles of accessibility, transparency, and accountability. It means
considering the societal outcomes of research at least as attentively as
the scientific and technological outputs. It means insisting that in
addition to being rigorous, science be popular, relevant, and
participatory.
These conceptions of democratization are neither new nor,
when applied to science, idiosyncratic. They have appeared
in discussions about science at critical historical
junctures. For example, the Allison Commission, a
congressional inquiry into the management of federal science
in the 1880s, established the principle that even the
emerging “pure science” would, when publicly financed, be
subject to norms of transparency and accountability,
despite John Wesley Powell’s protestations. After World War
II, the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF)
hinged on establishing a politically accountable governing
structure. These concerns exist at the heart of arguments
made by theorists such as Columbia University philosopher
Philip Kitcher, who describes the accessible and
participatory ideal of “well-ordered science” in his
Science, Truth, and Democracy. They likewise exist in many
current science agencies and programs, but there they often
fly under the radar of higher-profile issues or have been
institutionalized in ways that undermine their intent.
They do not exist, however, as an agenda for democratizing
science. Below, I attempt to construct such an agenda: a
slightly elaborated itemization of ways to democratize both
policy for science and science in policy.
Policy for science
In the past, critics of elite science attempted to
democratize policy for science by expanding the array of
fields that the federal government supported, as Sen. Harley
Kilgore attempted to do with the social sciences in the
early debate over NSF, or by creating programs that were
explicitly focused on societal needs, as Rep. Emilio Daddario did with NSF’s Research Applied to National Needs.
These approaches were problematic because public priorities
are just as easily hijacked by disciplinary priorities in
the social sciences as in the natural sciences. Moreover,
at a basic research institution such as NSF, applied
research may be either too small to have great influence on
the larger society or just large enough to threaten the pure
research mission. My agenda for democratizing policy for
science takes a different tack by broadening access across
the sciences and across the levels at which priorities are
set.
First, engage user communities and lay citizens more fully
in review of funding applications. Such “extended peer
review” increases the presence of public priorities
without mandating research programs or diluting quality. The
National Institutes of Health (NIH) pioneered a modest form
of extended peer review by including citizens on its grant
advisory councils, but the councils’ reviews of study
sections’ recommendations have a pro forma quality. The NIH
Web site acknowledges that “the use of consumer
representatives may be extremely helpful in the review of
certain areas of research,” but it still holds “it is often
neither necessary nor appropriate to include consumer
representatives in peer review.” A more thorough use of
extended peer review occurs at the National Institute on
Disability and Rehabilitative Research of the Department of
Education, which seeks input from relevant disability
communities in funding decisions and post-hoc review.
Disciplinary research such as that supported by NSF would be
less likely to benefit from such input, although priorities
across areas of inquiry, such as climate research, would
benefit from an understanding of what public decision-makers
want and need to know. For the vast majority of
mission-oriented public R&D spending, such participation is
likely a better way to ensure the conduct of basic research
in the service of public objectives, a goal sought by a
diverse set of analysts, including Lewis Branscomb and
Gerald Holton (“Jeffersonian science”), Donald Stokes
(“Pasteur’s Quadrant”), and Rustum Roy (“purposive basic
research”), not to mention policy-makers Sen. Barbara
Mikulski (D-Md.) (“strategic research”) and the late Rep.
George Brown (“science in service of society”).
Second, increase support for community-initiated research at
universities and other research institutions. National R&D
priorities are driven by large private investments. Through
changes in intellectual property, public investments have
become increasingly oriented toward the private sector, even
as private R&D spending has grown to twice the size of
public R&D spending. “Science shops” — research groups at
universities that take suggestions for topics from the local
citizenry — offer the opportunity for community-relevant
priorities to emerge from the bottom up.
This research might include more applied topics that are
unlikely to draw grant money, such as assessments of local
environmental health conditions. It might also facilitate
connections between research universities and local
economic interests that are less dependent on intellectual
property. These connections would be akin to agricultural
or manufacturing extension, and they could be funded in the
same politically successful way. By allowing some of the
priorities of the research enterprise to emerge more
directly from local communities, science shops can help
reinvigorate the concept of “public interest science,”
articulated in the 1960s by Joel Primack and Frank Von
Hippel, and help set a research agenda that is not captive
to large economic interests.
Third, restructure programs in the ethical, legal, and
societal implications (ELSI) of research. If ELSI programs,
such as those funded with the genome or nanotechnology
initiatives, are to facilitate democratic politics and
improve the societal impacts of knowledge-based innovation,
they need to meet two criteria. First, they must extend into
research areas that have not already been designated for
billion-dollar public investments. Such a change would not
only protect them from being swamped by the mere scale of
technical activity but would also allow them to identify
technical areas prospectively and have an influence on
whether and how such large-scale public investments are
made. Second, ELSI research must be more directly plugged
back into the policy process. ELSI programs should include
more technology assessment and “research on research,”
areas that can contribute to understanding the role of
science and technology in broader political, economic, and
cultural dynamics, but from which the federal government has
pulled back intramural resources. ELSI programs should also
have institutional connections to decision-makers, as the
genome program initially did. In addition to setting aside
three to five percent of the R&D megaprojects for ELSI work,
the federal government should set aside a similar amount for
all R&D programs over a certain size, perhaps $100 million,
and should fund much-expanded research programs in the
societal dynamics of science and technology through NSF.
Democratizing science advice
Discussion of the democratization of science advice borders
on the current controversy over politicization. Despite
their recent political currency, issues of science advice
will not attract media or move voters in the way that issues
of guns and butter will, and thus the circuit of
transparency and accountability will be incomplete. In
earlier periods of reform, concerns about the politics and
process of expert advice led to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, which mandates transparency in the actions
of advisory committees and balance in their membership. A
recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) found
that agencies need better guidance to implement the balance
requirement, but more wide-ranging action is needed.
First, recreate an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to
restore the policy-analytic balance between Congress and the
Executive Branch in matters scientific and technological.
Without competition from a co-equal branch, Executive-based
science advice has a monopoly, and monopolies in the
marketplace of ideas do not serve democracy. There have been
recent, behind-the-scenes efforts to reconstitute a
congressional capacity for technology assessment, including
a pilot project at GAO. A positive finding from an
independent evaluation of that project encouraged
Representatives Holt, Houghton, Barton, and Boehlert to
draft a bill authorizing $30 million for an Office of
Science and Technical Assessment (OSTA) in GAO. The bill
specifies that OSTA assessments would be publicly
available, thus contributing to democratic politics as
well as providing competition for Executive Branch
expertise. Even if OSTA is authorized and funded, its
influence would remain to be seen. But establishing OSTA
would create, at least in part, a public deliberative space
for science and policy that a modern democracy requires.
Second, enhance the transparency and accountability of
expert deliberations through discussion and articulation
of science policy rules. The decision rules for guiding how
experts provide science advice require more scrutiny and
better articulation. Even supposing that science advice
were purely technical, any group of experts larger than one
still needs a set of decision rules by which to settle
disagreement. The character of such rules, e.g., linear and
threshold models for assessing risk, is familiar in
environmental policy. Such rules also include the
admissibility of evidence, the definition of expertise and
conflicts of interest, the burden and standards of proof,
and the mechanisms for aggregating expert opinion. A
particular example of the last rule would be instituting
recorded votes within expert advisory committees, rather
than pursuing a vague consensus as most panels do.
Committees of the National Toxicology Program make
recommendations for the biennial Report on Carcinogens by
recorded vote, and it seems salutary as it both specifies
the relative level of agreement within the committee and
creates a record that can be used to assess the objectivity
and balance of a committee, thus providing information for
a more democratic politics of expertise. A second example
is the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision, which describes
considerations that trial judges should apply when deciding
on the admissibility of expert testimony. Every venue of
expert deliberation evaluates expertise implicitly or
explicitly, yet the rules for such evaluations are rarely
the focus of study, public discussion, or democratic
choice.
Third, increase the opportunities for analysis, assessment,
and advice-giving through the use of deliberative polling,
citizens’ panels, and other participatory mechanisms. Such
“participatory technology assessment” circulates views
among citizens and experts, promotes learning about both
science and democracy, and generates novel perspectives
for policy-makers. These mechanisms are more familiar in
European settings, where the Danish Board on Technology
uses citizens’ panels for public education and government
advising, and the Netherlands Office of Technology
Assessment develops other forms of public input. NSF has
recently funded quasi-experiments in face-to-face and Internet-mediated
citizens’ panels, and the Nanotechnology Research and
Development Act endorses the use of such panels, among other
outreach techniques, to inform the National Nanotechnology
Initiative (an arrangement that also connects ELSI to
policy). At Rutgers, I have recently created a Center for
Responsible Innovation, the mission of which includes
outreach to and collaboration with communities in addition
to research and teaching at the nexus of science and
society. At Arizona State University, the Consortium for
Science, Policy, and Outcomes is implementing a research
agenda called “real-time technology assessment” that
combines traditional technology assessment with historical,
informational, and participatory approaches in an effort to
incorporate intelligent feedback into knowledge-based
innovation. One could imagine building the capacity to
foster exchanges among experts, citizens, and civic
organizations at all major research universities—not to
replace more technocratic methods, but as a necessary
complement for a system of democratic science advice,
analysis, and assessment.
Some readers will surely find this agenda not nearly
far-reaching enough to democratize science. Others will
just as surely think it threatens the autonomy and
integrity of science. And there are most certainly grander
ways of perfecting our democracy that, although not
directly dealing with science, would transform it as well.
Such betwixt and between may be uncomfortable rhetorically,
but I think it wise politically. Science and democracy have
both been around for a long time without being perfected,
and my agenda will not complete the task. These incremental
steps, aimed at further implementing broadly recognized
values of accessibility, transparency, and accountability,
will admittedly not democratize science immediately and
thoroughly. Neither will they condemn it to populist
mediocrity. What pursuing this agenda might do, however,
is foster the intellectual and political conditions for a
relatively more democratic science to flourish within the
current wanting environment. Discussing this agenda may, at
the very least, shift the focus from sterile argument over
politicizing science to deliberation about democratizing
science.
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