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Perspectives


 

Nuclear Resurgence, Part I
by G. Pascal Zachary
 

A global revival of nuclear power is underway, spurred by higher oil and gas prices, rising demand for electricity in Asia, and growing worries of the role of carbon fuels in climate change.

 

Consider the following: China intends to build 24 to 30 nuclear plants in the next 15 years; this fall, the country issued a bid tender for the first 2 plants. India’s plans are less defined but possibly as ambitious, given the country’s growing need for electricity and its tiny reliance on nuclear power to date. Finland is building two new nuclear plants, Belgium is considering doing so, and France is studying a new generation of reactor technology. Oil-poor Japan, Korea and Taiwan, representing East Asia’s most important economies, are each building nuclear plants. In the U.S., which has the largest number of operating atomic power plants, no new plants are planned, yet operators of existing plants and the Bush administration are promoting a renewed building program around existing reactor technology and a new generation of commercial plants around so-called “high-temperature” reactors that are theoretically safer, cheaper to build and easier to run. Moreover, dozens of American nuclear-power plants, once thought to be destined for closure, are winning life-extension of at least 20 to 30 years, virtually guaranteeing that the U.S. will remain home to the largest number of commercial reactors in the world for the foreseeable future.

 

Securing the power reactors of the world, from either terrorist attack or catastrophic technical failure, remains a challenge – and that would be the case even if the tally of power reactors, which now stands at 103 in the U.S., did not grow at all. Nuclear power plants, and the radioactive waste they generate, are seeming targets for terrorists and non-state actors possessed of serious grievances. The specter of another Chernobyl or Three Mile Island haunts both the public and the operators of nuclear power plants, apparently limiting public-policy options and complicating the unfinished business of permanently storing waste created by commercial nuclear plants.

 

Perhaps most distressingly, the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons remains unresolved. Since the same basic “enrichment” processes are used in the creation of fuel for nuclear reactors and for nuclear weapons, the line between power-making and bomb-making is inherently indistinct, defying easy answers over what constitutes an international security threat. Iran’s insistence on mastering techniques for enrichment of nuclear material has raised legitimate fears of an Iranian bomb. Yet no similar fears are spawned by Brazil or South Korea, both of whom have mastered enrichment techniques and invoke national self-reliance and sovereignty in defense of their technical mastery. The contradiction exposes a fundamental problem in the management of nuclear power: whereas the development of nuclear weapons comes under international rules and norms, the development and management of nuclear power does not. The lack of consistency between the standards of operation of nuclear power plants across countries raises questions about the prospects and perils of nuclear power in a globalized world.

 

In recent months, I have been visiting nuclear power plants, interviewing their managers and the executives of utilities who own them. I have been surveying the recent literature in the field, talking with critics, and pondering the course of what others are identifying as a “nuclear spring.” In two short CSPO “Perspectives,” I will present several key questions arising from a revival of nuclear power. In the second paper, I will raise questions about security of nuclear plants, the potential for terrorist exploitation of these plants and the extent to which nuclear plants spur the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this first paper, I will briefly survey four important questions about the economic, technical and environmental sustainability of nuclear power..

 

1. Is nuclear power economically viable?

 

Nuclear power remains too expensive relative to other sources of energy. That’s the conclusion of two massive recent studies, one assembled by M.I.T. and the other by the University of Chicago. The number-crunching is mind-numbing, but the bottom line is clear: at today’s prices for alternative sources, existing nuclear designs aren’t sufficiently cost-effective. New designs might remedy this, but they have yet to be tested in the market. The case for nuclear power is undercut by credible claims that other energy sources are less expensive. But the rising costs of these alternative sources, the belief that the true environmental costs of these sources is not fully taken into account, and prospect of less costly reactor designs combine to give hope to nuclear advocates that cost-comparisons will move in their favor.

To be sure, cost isn’t everything. Nuclear power has always attracted government support for strategic and national security reasons (and that’s setting aside engagement in nuclear power as a cover for nuclear weapons activity). China’s push into nuclear power reflects the nation’s desire for a more diverse portfolio of energy sources. “Long-term the Chinese still look for energy security,” says Kwang Wu, an expert on Chinese energy issue and a researcher at the East-West Center in Hawaii. Currently nuclear contributes less than 2 percent to the country’s energy mix (compared to 20 percent in the U.S. and 75 percent in France). China switched on its first nuclear power plant only in 1993, so – another plus – it is a late-comer to the nuclear field. With only a tiny “installed base” of nuclear plants, China looks forward to adopting the latest, best technologies – and avoiding many of the problems that afflicted programs in the U.S. through a highly-centralized and rigorous approach to safety and reliability (the French model).

A major motivation for China’s nuclear expansion is non-economic. Air pollution is a growing problem in China, and authorities are seeking alternatives to excessive reliance on coal-fired plants. Nuclear also lets China experiment with technological leadership. The country is sponsoring one of only a few active tests of a high-temperature gas reactor; experts consider the “pebbled bed” to be the safest and most cost-effective “next-generation” technology. In the meantime, China intends to rely on French, Canadian and American technologies for its next dozen reactors. Even with Western technological assistance, experts worry that China’s program is too aggressive. To achieve its goal, the country must bring on line one to two large nuclear power plants every year for a dozen years starting in 2007. While it is questionable whether China can reach that level, the country’s attempt is sufficient on its own to revive the global nuclear power industry. And that’s even if oil and gas prices remain at current levels – and nuclear retains its cost disadvantages.

These cost disadvantages remain the biggest barrier to the construction of more plants in the U.S. Advocates often cite the uncertain regulatory environment or the lack of sufficient government subsidies as critical hurdles, but the nuclear cost penalty is actually the most significant deterrent. As a rule, utilities are privately-owned and operated in the U.S. (as opposed to France and China, where are they are not), and U.S. private utilities, especially after the traumas of deregulation, are highly concerned about profitability. Existing nuclear plants can be highly profitable as going concerns, because funds for decommissioning have already been set aside, and the capital costs incurred (and sometimes completely paid off). But the multi-billion dollar price tags of new plants makes them at least ten times more than costly conventional power plants. No wonder that in U.S., according to The New York Times, there are only two applications to build new nuclear plants and more than 100 to build coal-fueled plants. Nuclear power doesn’t contribute greenhouse gases, but coal still draws a crowd because private utilities need a quick return on investment.

2.  Is there a technically- and politically-acceptable solution to the problem of permanent storage of nuclear waste and will the absence of a solution choke off the current “nuclear spring.”?

 

Neither in the U.S. nor anywhere else is the problem of long-term storage of nuclear waste “solved.” Despite years of complaints about the inadequacy of the temporary storage facilities (usually located on the same sites as nuclear power plants themselves), these temporary facilities remain the backbone of the nuclear waste storage capability. The decision by the federal government to create a permanent storage site in Nevada’s Yucca Mountain has yet to be carried out. As the past election highlighted, Nevadans remain bitterly opposed to the waste site in their backyard, and the site may never be opened because of continuing questions about its technical integrity.

The inability of the U.S., France, and other technologically advanced nations to resolve the nuclear waste problem casts a shadow over any ambitious plan for reviving nuclear power in Europe and North America. Opponents of nuclear power continue to cite the lack of permanent waste sites as a primary reason for discarding the atomic-energy option. Indeed, within the U.S. and France the lack of a permanent waste site may well prove to be a decisive objection, forestalling the possibility of new nuclear plants in these countries. That China and India would surrender their aspirations on similar grounds is much less certain.

 

3.  Will the global environmental movement embrace nuclear power as a tool in the fight against global climate-change, or will it continue its opposition?

 

The growing body of evidence on climate change is, more anything else, sparking a reappraisal of nuclear power among environmentalists. The grounds for reappraisal are utilitarian: in terms of environmental sustainability, nuclear power may be a lesser evil than fossil fuels. The tactical implications for environmental activists are clear: support an expansion of nuclear power as part of the drive to reduce reliance on carbon-based fuels.

The logic and language of trade-off is being warmly embraced by executives at utilities who own nuclear plants; they insist that major environmental figures are preparing to advance their cause. Yet no leading environmentalist or environmental organization has done so in public. Privately, leading environmentalists recognize the “lesser evil” logic but they also say that the policy response to global climate change is as yet so immature and undefined that it is premature for them to set aside longstanding objections to nuclear power (see
December 2004 CSPO “Perspective” by Steve Rayner). A growing concern over terrorism (which I will pursue in Part II of this article) also makes environmentalists reluctant to change their position. In fact, environmentalists have long recognized nuclear power’s claim to environmental benefit. Historian Samuel Walker noted in Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective (University of California Press, 2004) that since the 1970s“environmentalists recognized the advantages of nuclear power in reducing air pollution, but they became increasingly critical of the technology on other grounds.”

That paradox remains. A shift in the traditional environmental position is therefore possible but by no means inevitable, despite what appears to be an urgent need to respond to climate change. And without a major shift in the public positions of leading environmental organizations, nuclear power is unlikely to ever greatly expand in the U.S. The nuclear industry likes to cite public opinion polls showing a majority of Americans in favor of building new plants. But environmental organizations have enormous credibility with ordinary citizens, and, as the experience of such plants as Diablo Canyon in California, and Shoreham in New York, any wide-ranging campaign against specific nuclear plants would surely have a strong effect on public opinion. On the other hand, even the grudging acceptance of nuclear power by the leading mainstream environmentalists would alter the terms of both the debate over climate change and the world’s energy mix, and help to catalyze a nuclear resurgence.

4. Should the problems of nuclear power be internationalized through a treaty or a voluntary yet binding agreement among nations with nuclear power plants?  

 

Despite the technical complexity of nuclear power, the greatest risks posed by this technology have been tied to human error. The lesson of both Three Mile Island and Chernobyl was that nuclear experts, obsessed with purely technological issues of design integrity and robustness of redundancy systems, had neglected human factors such as training and management competency. As Walker has noted, after an extensive review of the literature: “There were similarities in the accidents at Three Miles Island [1979] and Chernobyl [1986]. Both accidents were due largely to operator errors that exacerbated design flaws or mechanical malfunctions. In both cases, technicians overrode safety systems that could have prevented or mitigated the damage.”

In the wake of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, human performance issues became central to the operation of nuclear power plants. In his study of nuclear power practices, Hostages of Each Other (1986), Joseph Rees documented the origins of a new approach to raising standards in the U.S. Through relentless sharing of practices and peer assessment, U.S. nuclear operators gradually improved their performance, driven by a recognition that the failure of any one plant would likely doom the rest of the industry, no matter how well many other plants were being run.

In the U.S., within a year of the Three Mile Island accident, nuclear operators formed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. The group remains a major force behind what executives describe as the “continuous improvement” of the standards of operation of nuclear power plants. A similar group has formed to cover the rest of the world but it is not equipped to handle the challenges posed by the likely rapid expansion of nuclear power in the world’s two most populous countries, India and China. While the Chinese collaborate with Western experts in developing their nuclear technology, the Indians do not, because of sanctions related to their “unauthorized” testing of nuclear weapons. As India proceeds along a broader path of commercial nuclear power, it will need Western assistance to assure that its practices mirror the industry standard. And while China receives technology that matches the best in the West, that is no assurance that its nuclear plant performance will match the U.S. or Europe. Even some nuclear operators in technologically advanced countries may wish to import operating assistance. For example, the British government, which is saddled with several poor-performing nuclear plants, has tried and failed to hire a professional nuclear management company (from the U.S.) to take over the running of these plants.

One innovative way to promote higher operating standards at nuclear energy facilities around the world would be to create an International Nuclear Management Company that would provide the necessary expertise for “reforming” poorly operating plants wherever they were located. There is precedent for such an approach at the national level. In the U.S., a Wisconsin company, called the Nuclear Management Company, supplies such a service. So does Entergy, a New Orleans-based utility that owns ten nuclear power plants in the Northeast and Southeast. Professional rescue of troubled nuclear power plants on a global basis need not be handled only by private companies, but they are more likely to get the job done quickly and well than an international entity such as the United Nations. To encourage the emergence of what we might call a “nuclear foreign legion,” leading governments of the world ought to agree that such exchanges of expertise are important to maintaining nuclear safety. But governments would also need to recognize and openly acknowledge which plants were in need of such attention, and this could prove challenging in the still secretive and often clubby world of nuclear power.

(End Part I)

 


G. Pascal Zachary is a senior writer with Time Inc.’s Business 2.0 magazine and an independent scholar specializing in issues of technology and society. Formerly a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, he is the author of Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century (Free Press, 1997). Among his more recent work has been a series of articles on the role of information technology in the economic development of Africa, including a white paper,
Black Star, commissioned by CSPO. He can be contacted at: greggzachary@hotmail.com.

 

The views expressed here are those of the author.

References:
 

Balogh, Brian. 1991. Chain Reaction: Expert Debate & Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power, 1945-1975. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

 

Business Week, “With Oil Over $50, Nukes Are Back,” Nov. 8, 2004.

 

Business Week, “Grabbing a Piece of the Nuclear Action,” Dec. 27, 2004.

 

Forbes, “Nukes are Back, Jan. 31, 2005.

 

Fortune, “The Queen of the Nukes: Anne Lauvergeon, head of French nuclear giant Areva, wants the world to give atomic power another chance. Is the world ready to listen?” May 17, 2004.

 

Fortune, “Nuclear Spring,” Jan. 10, 2005.

 

Hertsgaard, Mark. 1983. Nuclear Inc.: the Men and Money Behind Nuclear Energy. Pantheon, New York, NY.

 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2003. The Future of Nuclear Power: an Interdisciplinary MIT Study. MIT, Cambridge, MA..

 

New York Times, “Fuel of the Future? Some Say Coal,” Nov. 20, 2004.

 

New York Times, “China Promotes Another Boom: Nuclear Power,” Jan. 15, 2005.

 

Rees, Joseph. 1994. Hostages of Each Other: the Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

 

Union of Concerned Scientists. 2004. U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century.

 

University of Chicago. 2004. The Economic Future of Nuclear Power. University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.

Walker, J. Samuel. 2004. Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.  

Wall Street Journal, “Nuclear-Power Industry Sees Signs of a U.S. Revival,” Nov. 9, 2004.

 

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